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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by the issuance of Writ
of Certiorari, by this Court on June 12, 1989, and by reliance upon
Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, as well as
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This is a criminal matter which began in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Monticello, appealed first to the Circuit Court, and then
to the Utah Court of Appeals, where the appeal was dismissed for
lack of Jurisdiction, (The Court however did not support Monticello's
position in dismissing the appeal [see Citv of Monticello v.
Christensen 769 P.2d 853 (Utah App. 1989)].
The appeal is here in this Court by grant of Writ of Certiorari.
STATEMENT Q? ISSUES
Since the Court has not issued any limitations regarding the
issues on review the Petitioner believes that the relevant issues on
appeal are as originally stated in his initial brief, to wit:
1. Is a "pro se" appellant to be held to the same stringent
standards as an appellant who is represented by a professional law
trained individual?
2. Does a "pro se" appellant have a right to have his appeal
heard on it's merits, regardless of how inartfully he has argued his
case in the lower Courts?
3. Does an accused person have a right to appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals, of a criminal matter, under the Utah Constitution
Article 1 Sec. 12?
4. Does the State of Utah have to give "full Faith and Credit" to
the "public acts" of the State of Wyoming, under Article IV Sec. 1 of
the Constitution of the United States?
5. Does the State of Utah have the power to suspend a license
which was validly issued in the State of Wyoming?
6. Can a person, who has been issued, and has in his possession
a valid, properly issued license be charged under UC 41-2-28
"Driving Under Suspension of License"?
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AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON
Constitutional Provisions
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I Section 12
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right
to * * * appeal in all cases * * *"
Article VIII Section 3
"* * * The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
over
all other matters to be exercised as provided by
statute, and
power to issue all writs and orders necessary
for the exercise of
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the
complete determination
of any cause.''
U.S. CONSTITUTION
Article IV Section 1
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public
acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every of
Every other
State."
Statutes
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
UC41-2-l(n)
"License means the privilege to operate a motor vehicle
over
the highways of this state."
UC 41-2-4
"(1) A nonresident who is at least sixteen years of age
and
who has in his immediate possession a valid operator's
license
certificate issued to him in his home state or
country may
operate a motor vehicle in this state only as
an operator.* * *"
UC 41-2-28
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"A person whose Operator's License has been suspended
or
revoked as provided by this act, and who drives any
motor
vehicle upon the highways of this State while that
license is
suspended or revoked is guilty of a crime."
UC 41-17-3 "Driver's License Compact Article 1Kb)
"'Home state' means the state which has issued and has
the
power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or
permit to
operate a motor vehicle"
(emphasis added)
UC 41-2-603 (5) "Driver's License Compact
"The licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction may
not
suspend the privilege of a motorist for whom a report
has
been issued."
(emphasis added)
WYOMING STATUTES
WS 31-9-204
M
* * * Upon receipt of such certification that the operating
privilege of a resident of this State has been suspended
or
revoked in any such other state pursuant to a law
providing for
its suspension or revocation for failure to
provide security for
the payment of judgements arising out
of a motor vehicle
accident or for failure to deposit both
security and proof of
financial responsibility * * * the
superintendent shall suspend
the license of such resident*
* * ••

but
same

(This statute was in place when defendant was convicted
Wyoming has since enter the Compact and adopted the
Statutes as listed above)
STATEMENT OF CASE

This is a criminal case which was tried originally in the
Monticello Justice of the Peace Court of Monticello, the Honorable
Justice Wright presiding, and was tried deNovo in the Twelfth (now
Seventh) Circuit Court the Honorable Judge Halliday presiding. At
both Trials defendant/appellant Lee Christensen (hereinafter
3

referred to as Christensen) was found guilty of driving on a
Suspended License in violation of UCA 41-2-28 although an abstract
of his valid Wyoming License was in evidence (See Court Record Item
20 Page 30-31). The case was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals
and dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction owing to the fact that
Christensen was unable to provide transcripts of the trial in the
Circuit Court to establish that he had raised Constitutional issues in
that Court [(see Monticello v. Christensen 769 P.2d 853 (Utah App.
1989)]. Writ of Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court on
June 12, 1989. This case is properly before this Court by the Court's
own power to grant certiorari to determine the law (See Article VIII
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution.)
FACTS
Christensen would wish to add the following facts (not already
submitted either in Appellants Brief or in Respondents Brief) to the
record for the purpose of clarification.
1. Christensen was issued a license by the state of Utah on
August 9, 1979, which was made to expire on July 17, 1980. (see
exhibit B)
2. Since the date of that expiration Christensen has not
reapplied for licensing by the state of Utah, but has been
subsequently licensed by the states of California, Alaska, and
Wyoming as his residences have changed.
3. Christensen was issued a license by the state of Wyoming on
July 17, 1984 (See Exhibit A), which did not expire until July 17,
1988.
4. At the time of the accident (October 2, 1986) for which his
license was allegedly suspended, he presented his Wyoming
license,(see Exhibit B).
5. At the time Christensen was arrested for "Driving on
Suspension" he presented his still valid (see Exhibit A) Wyoming
Driver's License (see recorded transcript of the trial in Circuit Court
tape #88SJ008 digital reading
3302-3140-Testimony of Officer Palmer)
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SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT

Christensen did appear "pro se" during all phases of this case,
contrary to the allegations contained in Monticello's Brief, and is not
asking for "special treatment" only that the Court view his
uneducated, inartful arguments, exactly for what they were intended
to be, a layman's assertion of his constitutional rights, as he
understands them and is capable of articulating them.
Christensen did raise the "Full Faith and Credit" argument in
both the Justice of the Peace and Circuit Courts, and challenged Utah's
power to suspend his Wyoming license. Because of his inability to
provide transcripts to the Utah Court of Appeals he was unable to
establish proof of his prior arguments, especially in light of
Monticello's insistence that he never raised the issues, therefore his
appeal was dismissed in that Court. That problem is overcome in this
appeal by the Court's granting transcripts.
Utah has no power under the U.S. Constitution to suspend a
license issued by the state of Wyoming, and if such statutory
authority was created by statute (which it is not) it would be invalid
under the Constitution of the United States.
ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT ONE
Christensen was not represented by law trained counsel,
indeed he was not represented at all as evidenced by the fact that he
at all times spoke, cross-examined witnesses, and argued motions for
himself.(See recorded transcripts tape 88SJ008 digital reading 2740
to end and tape 88SJ010 ) No one else spoke for him, although Judge
Halliday did allow, pursuant to Christensen's motion, a paralegal to
sit at counsel table, for the limited purpose helping him with
documents, and staying on point of law. It was clearly understood
by the Court, through Christensen's motion, and argument that he
was representing himself. Many lawyers have paralegals, witnesses,
defendants, and other personnel who sit at counsel table with them
5

for much the same purposes, and yet that never means, or is
interpreted to mean that those persons are representing the lawyer,
and cannot be construed as such here. Christensen did in fact appear
"pro se"
ARGUMENT TWO
Christensen did raise the "full Faith and Credit" argument in the
Circuit, as well as the Justice of the Peace Courts, although he did so
inartfully, and not in the manner that a law trained individual may
have done. He did not quote the Article and Section of the U.S.
Constitution but he did state it clearly enough for all parties to
understand the essence of the issue, on argument of his motion for
dismissal (See recorded transcripts tape 88SJ010 digital reading 165270) to wit;
CHRISTENSEN (Arguing motion to the Court)
"I am a licensed driver in the State of Wyoming and the
State of Wyoming recognizes that license as it states in the abstract.
mv status is clear. Because I am being charged with unlawful to
drive while license is suspended or revoked, that's not the case
because I do have a license to drive and that license or privilege
extended bv the state of Wyoming and is recognized in all the states
of the Union including Utah. * * * The point always comes back to I
was licensed bv the state of Wyoming and it has to be recognized bv
the state of Utah* * *there again, as the abstract shows, I have a
license to drive and I was driving on that license and I don't, I just
don't see where the law can be applied to me because I'm charged
with not driving with a license. At the time I had the license in my
possession and I was authorized to drive and will be so until my
birthdate. And so I feel this ought to be dismissed because mv
driving status states that I am licensed bv the state of Wyoming and
Wyoming recognizes it * * *
As Christensen did in fact appear "pro se", his failure to exactly
specify the Constitutional citation he referred to, and the inartful
method of his argument, should be overlooked by the Court, as the
issue pressed was clear enough for consideration. In Haines v.
6

Kerner 404 U.S. 519(1971) the Court held that a "pro se's" case
should be heard on it's merits regardless of it's inartfullness.
ARGUMENT THREE

In State v. Muneer 642 P2d 721 (Utah 1982) Justice Durham
rejected a "pro se's" appeal because;
" The alleged error relates solely to construction".
and relied upon the statutory rule in UC 78-3-5 which allowed
for appeals to the Supreme Court where constitutional issues are
present. In Munger, no constitutional issues were raised. The
instant case raises a very distinct constitutional issue, although it is
not argued with the finesse a lawyer might use.
F u r t h e r m o r e , Monticello, in it's Brief relies upon a
Constitutional, section which was repealed in 1985, and had no
bearing on a case tried in 1987 (Utah Constitution Article VIII
Section 9) and the law on such appeals is now governed by statute
(UCA 77-35-26 (13), while the Utah Supreme Court is given wider
power to determine any cause through the issuance of writs (Utah
Constitution Article VIII Section 3) which was in this case
accomplished by the issuance of the Writ of Certiorari by this Court
on June 12, 1989, possibly because the Court understood that a
constitutional issue was being raised, which was a case of first
impression in the state of Utah.

ARGUMENT FOUR
Christensen believes that, although he did so inartfully, he did
raise the Full Faith and Credit argument in both the lower Courts (his
argument in the Justice Court was a similar argument as is presented
in the Circuit Court) Monticellos Prosecutor, Mr. Anderson, asserts
that he would have dismissed the case at an earlier time had he been
aware of that argument then, yet he is law trained and should be
much more cognizant of Direct Constitutional quotations, than
7

Christensen, an uneducated construction worker, and should have
recognized Christensen's statements that his license was issued by
Wyoming and must be recognized in all of the States including Utah
as a paraphrase of U.S. Constitution Article IV Section 1. It is after
ail a prosecutor's ethical duty to seek justice, not solely convictions

ARGUMENT FIVE

The state of Utah recognizes that it does not have the power to
suspend licenses issued by other states in it's definition of 'Home
state" within the Driver's License Compact, as well as it's various
instructions on how to handle a violation by a nonresident driver.
Wyoming before joining the Compact provided a procedure whereby
a Wyoming resident's license could be suspended for violations in
another state (WS 31-9-204) which cannot be interpreted as consent
for another state to suspend it's resident's licenses.
Further of the cases relied upon by Monticello, only New
Hampshire v. French. 117 N.H. 785, 378 A.2d 1377 is applicable as in
that case the defendant was issued a valid license by another state
before the alleged suspension took place, and in that case the court
reversed the conviction of Driving on Suspension, although not on the
Full Faith and Credit issue. Christensen, like French was issued his
license by Wyoming (in 1984) before the alleged suspension took
place (1986), and Utah may have taken the proper steps for
Wyoming to suspend his license, but for some reason did not,
therefore, no suspension took place because Utah is not empowered
to suspend the license granted by another state.
The other cases relied upon by Monticello, Connecticut v. Rov
23 Conn. Supp, 176 A.2d 66. District of Columbia v. Fred 281 U.S. 49,
State v. Harkness. 189 Kan. 581, 370 P. 2d 100, State v. Dalton. 13
Wash. App. 94, 533 P. 2d 864, State v. lustesen. 63 Or. App. 544, 665
P. 2d 380 , are not applicable as each of them involves a case where
the defendant's license was suspended in one state, and sought a
license in the other state while his license was still under suspension
8

in the original state. At trial Christensen introduced the abstract of
his Wyoming license(see recorded transcripts tape digital number
3230-3290), which dates were sufficient to prove that his license
was validly issued prior to the alleged suspension of his license by
Utah {in 1986)

ARGUMENT SIX
Christensen's license from Wyoming was valid at the time of
his arrest,(as evidenced by his Wyoming license abstract Exhibit A).
Even the Arresting Officer was aware of it's validity as his testimony
clear shows (See recorded transcripts tape 88SJ008 digital reading
3020-3140) in particular where he states the following;
OFFICER PALMER TESTIMONY
Officer Palmer: "
* * * He produced a Wyoming Driver's
License and
apparently the Wyoming Driver's License was
valid * * *
On cross examination by Christensen
Christensen: "* * * Again as you stated before* * * when you
asked for
my driver's license I gave you a valid Wyoming
Driver's
License"
Officer Palmer: "That is correct."
* * *

Christensen: "* * * But you had no indication that my Wyoming
license
had been suspended?"
Officer Palmer: "That is correct."
having had testimony and evidence presented showing the
validity of Christensen's license issued by Wyoming, Monticello
should have of it's own motion dismissed the case against
Christensen on the Full Faith and Credit argument. Then this
"seemingly endless litigation" could have been avoided. Christensen's
financial resources are not great either, and he is not being paid to
pursue this appeal either. Mr. Anderson could have saved the City of
Monticello great expense at the lower Court level.
9

SUMMARY
It is true that this case should not have been allowed to
proceed this far. Christensen was validly licensed by Wyoming prior
to any alleged suspension took place and therefore, to suspend his
license Utah must go through the State of Wyoming in order to not
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Further as a "pro se" Christensen's arguments may not be as
sophisticated as those of an attorney, but the issue was raised and
his argument deserves to be heard on it's merits.
Christensen respectfully urges the Court to r e v e r s e his
conviction and to order the return of his money now in the
Possession of the Courts, as well as any such other relief as the Court
deems appropriate.
Dated this 26th day of August 1989.

Respectfully submitted
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rfffiTTFTCATTON OF MAILING
I certify that four true and correct copies of the copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief was mailed to the opposing counsel by placing
same in the U.S. Mail first class postage prepaid to the following
address
Lyle Anderson
P. 0. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535
on the
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day of
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WYOMING
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION
DRIVER RECORD INFORMATION

PAGE:
DATE:

0-4 6127
r i s t e n s e n , Lee H a t f i e l d
5 Hwy 30 E a s t
l n s t o n , WY 8 2 9 3 0

1
1987/10/22

B:
1943/07/17
HGT: 5 - 1 0 . F T - I N
WGT: 2 0 0 LBS
SEX: M SSN: 5 2 9 - 2 9 - 3 3 5 8
IVER LICENSE: NO.
:,«,ld0852-672
CLASS
: C
OLD DL: 7 2 8 4 1 9 9 0 1 5
ISSOEDti i , 9 8 V 0 7 / J 7 : ^ LIST DATE VALID: 1 9 8 8 / 0 7 / 1 7
\ *v - "*
fSTRICTIONS
NONE
OCCOR/CONV
DATE

2SCRIPTION
a i l u r e to Yield
CIT191U220S

1986/10/0 2
1986/10/15

Right-of-way
iii>
Status

••-.

Clear

END OF DRIVING RECORD
>! i '.

**

r-#

EXHIBIT A

f

END DATE

D f PAR I Ml N l O f PlJRI IC S'M f IN
JOHN T NIELSEN COMMISSIONE
D DOUGLAS BODRERO. DEPUTY COMMISSIONE
L DALE ELTON DEPUTY COMMISSIONE

NORMAN H BANGERIEH GOVERNOR

October 23, 1987
Lyo1 Vnderson
Ci ty At (orney
P.O. Box 275
Monti c e l l o , Utah

84535-0275
He: Lee U Christensen
In reply, please refer to
Accident File No. 2-10-636649
Re: Motor vehicle accident which
ocv.un<\! on Ocfober 2, 1986
in or near Salt Lake City
D.L/File No.: 2155273

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
L<*o II Chris tensen uas issued a Utah Driver License on August 9, 1979 vAich
was made to expire on July 17, 1980. lie has not renewed his Utah driving
privilege since that time. However, on October 2, 1986 he was involved as the
responsible person in an accident. At that time lie showed the officer a
Wyoning driver license, number 7284199015.
The accident resulted in substantial damages. On^February 5r 1987 Mr.
Chrisj/3nsen_wa^ susjiended for one yearjby Financial "Responsibility pursuant to
the October j ^ 1986^ accidents That ^suspelTsfOTTlrtlT^enH on February 5, 1988".
If there are further questions in this matter, please contact this office.
Respectfully,

G. Barton Blacks tock
Bureau Chief
Records
GBB:kh:ngra

EXHIBIT B

P 10101 Rev 6 - T

DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION

•

4501 SOUTH 2700 WEST PO BOX 30560

•

SALT LAKE CI TY Ul AH 84130-0560

(801)965 4 4 3 '

